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the stock of these private companies
accordinK to the amount of his pro-
lxerty, whether he wlil or no. For a
ferry, or a turnpike ora railway, may
be granted to one private person as
well as to a corporation, with the
privilege of selling shares, and the
work is none the less a public work,
because in the hands of one man, than
If owned by a thousand in the form of
a corporation. Some private persons
now own long lines of railway in our
country. If originally granted to one
private person, with the privilege of
selling shares, what is taxation for the
purpose of buying those shares, but
transferring so much ot the property
of the tax-payers to this private per-
son in payment for a portion of his
enterpriset
If men were not accustomed to look
upon the subject with a kind of infat-
nation, it has always seemed to us
that no free-minded man could say
that there was the slightest distinction
in principle between this species of
taxation and that which should be
applied to enable or to compensate a
private person or corporation for run
ning a stage-coach or an express wag.
on through the limits of the munici-
pality. But there is such a fixed de-
lusion In the public mind upon this
and many other subjects connected
with taxation, that .we scarcely dare
look for any speedy change. The
court did well to take their stand here
upon the high ground of truth, for
that must, in the end, prevail.
LF.E.
ABSTRACTS OF REC'ENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. 3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
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ADMIRALTY.
Collision.-A large steamer, without tows or other incumbrance,
approaching near to smaller ones with tows, under circumstances
where collision is liable to occur, is bound to move with caution.
She is mistress of her course and motions, and stands in a position
of advantage over the others. These have not full power over them-
selves. Seventeen miles an hour, in such a situation, is too great a
rate of speed for the larger and freer vessel to be moving at among
vessels having tows: The Syracuse, 
9 Wall.
Collision.-Where two vessels moving under steam are crossing
so as to involve a risk of collision, if the ship which has the other
on her starboard does keep out of the way of the other, as a ship in
that position is directed to do by the rules of navigation, adopted
1 From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in Vol. 9 of his Reports.
2 Prepared by J. H. Thomas, Esq.; to appear in 39 or40 Ga. Rep.
3 From the Judges of the Court ; to appear in 48 or 49 N. H. Rep.4 From Hon. O.L. Barbour, Reporter ; to appear in Vol. 56 of his Rep.
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by Congress by the Act of April 29th, 1864, and a collision oceurs
from the other vessel's not having kept on her ourse-as under the
said rules it is impliedly her duty in such a state of movements to
do-the obligation rests on this last vessel to show sufficient causes
existing in the particular case which rendered a departure from the
rule necessary to avoid an immediate danger: The Corsica, 9 Wall.
A steam vessel sailing in a harbor like that of New York, where
there are vessels at anchor and in motion, is bound to move at no
headway not entirely controllable: Id.
Collision-Appeals to Supreme Court-Practice.-Where the
District and the Circuit Court concur in their view of facts in a
collision case in admiralty, the case will come before this court
with every presumption in favor of the correctness of the decision
appealed from: The Quickstep, 9 Wall.
The fact that in a libel for collision a contract of towage is re-
cited in the libel, does not necessarily convert the libel into a pro-
ceeding on the contract. Where the real grievance alleged is a
wrong suffered by the libelant in the destruction of his boat, by
the carelessness and mismanagement of the boat libeled, the ref-
erence to the contract is to be regarded as made by way of induce-
ment to the grievance: I/.
An objection of a too general allegation of injury should be made
in the court below. It cannot be made here for the first time and
after the case has been below: Id.
In admiralty, an omission to state some facts which prove to be
material, but which cannot have occasioned any surprise to the
opposite party, will not be allowed to work injury to the libelant
on appeal, if the court can see that there was no design on his part
in omitting to state them: Id.
It is the duty of a vessel which undertakes to tow other boats
to see that the tow is properly made up and that the lines are
strong and securely fastened: I!.
AGENT.-See lnsurrection-International Law.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.
Effect of Submission on Pending Suit.--Mere submission to arbi-
tration of the matter of a pending suit will not, without any award,
operate as a discontinuance: Dinsmore v.Hanson, 48 or 49 N. H.
Where after such a submission the suit is with the consent of
the parties dismissed, it is within the discretion of the judge at the
trial term to strike off the entry of either party, and bring forward
the action: Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Custody of Goos-Levy by Sheriff under Process from State
Court.-The judge of the Supreme Court has no power by rule, in
vacation, to compel an assignee in bankruptcy to turn over to a sheriff
of a State court property of the bankrupt, which was in the posses-
sion of the bankrupt when the assignee took control of it, but which,
t is claimed, had been levied upon by the sheriff, by virtue of a
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f. fa. issued from a judgment of the State court older than the
judgment in the Bankrupt Court by which the defendant in the
fi. fa. was declared a bankrupt: Hill v. Fleming, 39 or 40 Ga.
Under such a state of facts the sheriff's remedy was by action
of trover, or by a proper proceeding in the Bankrupt Court which
has jurisdiction over the assignee: Id.
Where property is levied on by a sheriff under an execution from
a State court, and the defendant is judged a bankrupt, and no pro-
ceedings are taken in the Bankrupt Court to compel the property
levied upon to be brought into that tribunal for distribution, the
adjudication of bankruptcy and the issuing of the ordinary writ of
protection is no excuse to the sheriff for not proceeding to sell the
property and raising the money: Sharman v. Howell, 39 or 40 Ga.
BI.AIm.-See Criminal Law.
BILLs AND NOTES.
Partnership Notes-Liability of Firm.-Evidence that by the
articles of partnership one partner had no right to indorse negoti-
able paper, is admissible to defeat a bona fide holder of such pa-
per, indorsed with the firm name, by a member of the firm, and
taken by such bona fide holder for value, and without notice of
the articles: Michigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wall.
Where a partnership is in the habit of indorsing negotiable pa-
per, having blanks left for the date, and gives the paper so in-
dorsed to a person to use-he to fill the blank when be wishes to
use it-the firm is liable on the paper with the date filled in, when,.
thus complete, it has passed to the hands of innocent boha fide
holders for value: Id.
The power to fill the blanks for dates implies in favor of such
kolders a power in the person trusted, to change the date, after
the note has been written, and before it is negotiated: Id. -
CoL~IsIoN.-See Admiralty
COMMON CARnIER.
Action Against-Pleadings in-C ontract.-In assumpsit against
a common carrier, alleging that plaintiffs delivered to defend-
ants a large quantity of wool, to wit: 7,837 pounds, which they
promised to transport, and the proof was of a smaller quantity:
Hel4, it was no variance: Deming et al. v. Grand Trunk Bail-
road Co., 48 or 49 N. H.
Where the declaration states a delivery of the wool to the carrier
at its depot, to be transported immediately to a place named, and
avers that in consideration thereof, and of a certain reward, the
carrier promised, etc.: Held, that on receiving the wool under an
arrangement previously made, a duty arose to transport it accord-
ingly, from which the law will imply a promise to do so, and con-
sequently there was no variance in the proof of the considera-
tion: Id.
An allegation of a promise to deliver the goods to plaintiffs at
Portland, to be transported by another party to Boston, is to be
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regarded as a promise to deliver them in Portland simply, and
for nothing beyond: Id.
Where goods are contracted to be sold at a price fixed, to be
delivered at a particular place, and a carrier promises to transport
and deliver them in due time, with full notice that the goods are
sold if forwarded seasonably, the measure of damages for a breach
of his contract by which the consignor loses the sale is the differ-
ence between the contract price and the value of the goods when
actually delivered: Id.
Where a person testified that he was station agent at the depot
of the railroad, and had full charge of receiving and forwarding
freight there, although he testified that he had no authority to
make contracts, and no control over the locomotive power of the
road, it was held that a jury might legally find that the corpora-
tion held him out as their agent to contract for sending freight the
next day: Id.
Where there was a contract to carry freight at a particular time,
proof that its transportation was prevented by an unexpected rush
of freight is not admissible: Id.
A common carrier cannot dispute the title of the person de-
livering the goods for shipment by setting up adverse title in him-
self, or in third persons, which is not being enforced against him:
Wallace v. Matthews, 39 or 40 Ga.
CONFEDERATE STATEs.-See Insurrection.
How Regarded by the United States Courts-Payment by an
Officer of United States of Money to a Creditor of the United
States.-The voluntary payment by an officer of the Federal gov-
ernment, of money held by him for the government, to a creditor of
the United States, cannot be set up by him or his sureties as a de-
fense in a suit on his official bond: United States v.Keehler, 9 Wall.
The whole Confederate power must be regarded by this court as
a usurpation of unlawful authority, and its Congress is incapable
of passing any valid laws, whatever weight may be given under
some circumstances to its acts of force, on the ground of irresisti-
ble power, or to the legislation of the States in domestic matters;
as to which the court decides nothing now: Id.
A depository of the money of the United states or a public debtor
cannot defend against a suit on his official bond by proving that
he paid the money due the United States to one of its creditors, un-
der an order of the Confederate authorities, where he shows no force
or physical coercion which compelled obedience to such order: Id.
In a suit oil an official bond the obligation is not that of a mere
depository, but of a person who has made a contract, which ha
must, at his own peril, perform: Id.
The Acts of Congress of April 29, 1864, and March 3, 1865,
furnish the only exceptions to this rule which this court can acl
upon: Id
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
.x.Post Facto .Laws.-A. law of a State changing the place of
trial from one county to another county in the same district, or
even to a different district from that in which the offense was com-
mitted, or the indictment found, is not an ex post facto law, though
passed subsequent to the commission of the offense or the finding
of the indictment. An ex post facto law does not involve, in any
of its definitions, a change of the place of trial of an alleged offense
after its commission: Gut v. State, 9 Wall.
The decision of the highest court of a State, that an act of the
State is not in conflict with a provision of its constitution is con-
clusive upon this court: Id.
COURTS.
Conflict of Jurisdiction.-When the courts of this State and
the courts of the United States have concurrent jurisdiction over
the subject-matters and parties to a controversy, that tribunal
which first actually takes the jurisdiction will retain it: Trow-
bridge v. Rawson, Admintr'x, 39 or 40 Ga.
A State court cannot order a suit brought in a United States
court to be dismissed or proceedings in it to be staved, but it may
punish its own suitors for disobeying its process of injunction by
bringing such suit in contempt of said process: Id.
CRIMINAL LAw.-See Pleading.
Confessions.-Whether the confessions of a person accused of
crime are voluntary or not, is a question of fact to be determined
by the judge who tries the cause, and his decision that they were
voluntary, and admitting the evidence, will not be reversed
unless a case of clear and manifest error is shown: State v.
Squeers, 48 or 49 N. H.
In such a case it is not sufficient to reverse the decision that th t
witness pressed the respondent to disclose the really guilty party
behind him, that he might be punished, and suggesting that he. tht
respondent, might be called as a witness against the really guilty
party, in which case they would have to get him pardoned, tellin r
him at the same time that he could make him no promises: rd.
Confession.-When one charged with larceny was threatened
by the owner of the goods to be "prosecuted for damages," and
solicited to settle, and he replied he would pay fifty dollars i: it
could be settled: Held, that this was not admissible to show the
guilt of the defendant on an indictment for the larceny, the con-
fession, if such it was, having been made under the hope of a
settlement: Train v. State, 39 or 40 Ga.
Bigamy.-An indictment for bigamy must allege that the first
marrriage was lawful, or set forth such facts as will amount to
such an allegation: King v. State, 39 or 40 Ga.
Robbery.-An indictment for robbery, which does notcharge that
the money or other property was taken from the person of another
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by the defendant, is fatally defective, and it was error in the court
to refuse to arrest the judgment rendered upon it: Stegar v. The
State, 39 or 40 Ga.
Larceny-Indictment.-When the defendants were indicted for
the offense of simple larceny, and charged with having wrongfully
and fraudulently taken and carried away a certain "white hog,"
without alleging the hog to have been of any value: Held, that
by the common law, at the time of our statute, adopting the same,
the value of the property, in an indictment for simple larceny,
was required to be alleged and proved on the trial, and that that
rule of the common law is still in force in this State, and a failure
to allege the value of the property alleged to have been stolen, in
the indictment, is a good ground for arresting the judgment, after
verdict: Davis v. State, 39 or 40 Ga.
DAMAGES.-See Common Carrier.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Imprisonment for Debt-Non-payment of Alimony.-A person
imprisoned upon an execution issued to enforce a decree of alimony
comes within the act for the relief of poor debtors, and may law-
fully be discharged from arrest upon giving bond as provided in
the act relating to imprisonment and prison bonds: Shannon's
Case, 48 or 49 N. H.
Therefore the jailer is not liable to attachment for releasing from
imprisonment such debtor upon his giving the required bond: Id.
Arrest of Debtor on Execution-Subsequent Bankruptcy-In
a suit against the principal and sureties on a bond given by a
debtor arrested on execution, a discharge of the debtor in bank-
ruptcy after breach of the bond, will not avail the sureties as a
defense, and a plea by all the defendants of such discharge is bad
on demurrer: Claflin. v. Cogan, 48 or 49 N. H.
DEED.
Conditions.-Whatever will pass by words in a grant, will be
excepted by like words in an exception: Page v. Palmer andwife,
48 N. H.
A reservation as well as a grant may be made upon condition: Id.
When a grant or reservation is made upon conditions subse-
quent, the conditions are not favored in law, and are to be strictly
construed: Id.
In order to bind the heirs or assigns to the performance of such
conditions subsequent, they must be expressly mentioned in the
condition : rd.
Reservation of Road.-A reservation in a grant of the range-
way, "if ever wanted for a road," is not a reservation of a private
way, but is for a public highway, and the necessity for it is to be
deteprmined by the tribunal empowered to establish highways:
M,?fga,* v. Palmer, 48 or 49 N. H.
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Offcial Record of-Copies as Evidence.-When a deed may
properly be recorded in two places or offices, and is so recorded, and
the original is lost, one record, or a copy of it, may be introduced
to impeach the other, and from the whole the jury may find what
the original deed was: Wells v. Jackson Iron Co., 48 N. H.
After proof of an original deed to himself, or of his title by
descent or devise, a party may use an office copy of a deed to
which he is not a party, but which constitutes a part of his chain
of title, including the first or earliest title in the chain, as prima
facie evidence, without showing the loss of the original and with-
out proof of execution or delivery: Id.
A party wishing to prove title in a third person, not in the chain
of his own or his adversary's title, cannot use a copy until the origi-
nal has been sought for and proper effort made to obtain it, and
then if the copy is -used, it is only to prove the contents of the origi-
nal, after proof that such original was properly executed: Id.
When a copy of a deed is not used in a chain of title, it is evi-
dence only of the contents of the paper of which it is a copy, and
whatever proof of execution would be required if the original were
produced, should also be required in case the copy is used: Id.Ordinarily when a party on trial wishes to avail himself of any
instrument in writing lost by time and accident, he should, first,prove that a  origi al instrument was duly executed, with all the
formalities required by law, and secondly, that the instrument so
executed has been lost; then only can he give evidence of itscontents: Id.
If the last instrument was attested by witnesses, they should
be called or their absence properly accounted for before other
testimony can be received : Id.But when the witnesses cannot be produced, the admissions of
the opposite party of the existence of such documents may be
resorted to, and when that and all other direct evidence of the
execution or former existence of such instrument is wanting, the
fict may be proved by circumstances: Id.
When a deed is shown to have been properly executed and at-
tested, acknowledged snd recorded, that is Triton facie evidenceof its delivery: d.
But this evidence of delivery is not conclusive, and may be re-
eutted: Id.
The words tofrom and by, when used to express boundaries, are-
ordinarily terms of exclusion, and are always to be understood in
that way, unless there is something in the connection which makes
it manifest that they were used in a different sense: Id.
EQUITY.
Parol Gift of Land A- When Enforced.-Equity protects a pa-
rol gift of land equally with a parol agreement to sell it, if accom-
panied by possession, and the donee, induced by the promise to
give it, has made valuable improvements on the property. And
ihis is particularly true where the donor stipulates that the ex-
penditure shall be made. and by doing this makes it the consid-
eration or condition of the gift: Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall.
33
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The principle applied in the case of an antenuptial parol promise
by a father, to give to a lady about to marry his son (an improvi.
dent person), a lot of ground, she promising at the time to lay out
her own money in building a house upon it for the benefit of her-
self and family, and where possession was delivered and the house
was so built, but the father refused to convey the lot: Id.
In case of an alleged contract, by a father, of this kind, reason-
able certainty as to the fact and terms of it is all that equity re-
quires: Id.
The breach of such a contract is not to be compensated by dam-
ages, nor is the purpose of the contract so answered. Itis a ease
for specific performance: Id.
EviFNcE.--See Common Carrier-Deed-Husband and Wife
Telegraphic Dispatch-Evidence that a telegraphic dispatch was
sent from Northumberland to Montreal, addressed to A. G., and
that a telegraphic reply was receeived very soon after, purporting to
come from A. G. at Montreal, is not competent to show that A. G.
was at the time in Montreal: Eowley v. Whipple et al., 48 N. H.
Written Memorandum- Witness's Becollection.-When a wit-
ness testifies that at or about the time of a transaction or conversa-
tion he made a memorandum in writing of the same ; that he should
not have recollected the particulars of the transaction or conversa-
tion if he had not refreshed his memory by referring to the memo-
randum, but that having thus refreshed his memory, helis now able
to state those particulars from recollection, the memorandum is
not competent evidence to be submitted to the jury: Kelsen v.
Fletcher, 48 N. H.
The memorandum becomes evidence only when the witness is
unable, after examining it, to state the particulars from recollec-
tion, and when he can swear that he knew it to be correct at the
time it was made: Id.
The price at which a cow was sold, three years after, may be
competent evidence as to her value at the time in question,
whether such sale was before or after suit brought: Id.
HIGHwAY.-See Deed.
Dedication to Public Use-Title by Prescription.-The use of
a way for more than twenty years over ground in front of an acade-
my building, which was thrown open as a common, with occasional
repairs upon it and the filling up of gullies, does not, as a matter
of law, establish a right by prescription: Burnham v. Mc Ques-
lion, 48 or 49 N. H.
Where such land was thrown open as a common, and after
twenty years the owner built a fence across the way with a gate
at that point, and informed the person using it that it was done to
prevent such use, in reply to which no right of way was asserted,
it. was Held, that it was competent for a jury to find that such
user was permissive and not adverse: Id.
ABST ACTS Or RECENT DECISIONS.
HUsBAND AND WIFE.
.Evidence of Husband against the Wife.-In an action against
husband and wife, by a judgment creditor of the former, to have
his judgment declared a lien upon land purchased by the husband
in the name ot his wife, the examination of the* husband in sup-
plementary proceedings instituted against him after third persons
had gone into possession of the premises under the wife, is com-
Detent evidence against the husband but not against the wife:
Gillespie v. Walker and wife, 56 Barb.
Nor is a declaration of the husband, made after the title to the
land has become vested in the wife, that he has lut his property
out of his hands and got it so fixed that no creditors can reach it,
admissible in evidence against the wife. After the title is vested
in the wife, it cannot be diverted by the subsequent declaration of
the husband: Id.
INSURANCE.
Condition as to "any Change of Title" in the Property'insured.
-The sale of property and taking back a mortgage to secure the
purchase money, does not change the title, within the meaningof
a condition, in a policy of insurance, that in case of "any chango
of title" in the property insured, the policy shall cease and deter-
mine: Kitis et al. v. The Massasoit Insurance Co., 56 Barb.
Assignment of Policy.-Where, upon a sale by one of the
members of a firm of all his interest in the partnership property
and effects, there was no assignment or transfer, of any kind, of a
policy of insurance upon the partnership property to the purchaser
or any delivery of the policy, or of a certificate of removal to him,
Held, that although the language of the instrument of sale, taken
by itself, was broad enough to include the policy as one of the
choses in action of the firm, yet as it was manifest, from the whole
transaction and its surroundings, that no such thing was intended,
the policy did not pass by the instrument: Id.
INSURRECTION.-See Limitations.
Proceedings for Forfeiture -The seizure of the property of
which a forfeitute is sought by proceedings had under the Act of
Congress of July 17th, 1862, "to suppress insurrection, to punish
treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels,
and for other purposes," is the foundation of the subsequent pro-
ceedings. It is essential to give jurisdiction to the court to decree
a forfeiture: Pelham v. Bose, 9 Wall.
By the seizure of a thing is meant the taking of the thing into
possession, the manner of which, and whether actual or construc-
tive, depending upon the nature of thing seized. As applied to
subjects capable of manual delivery the term means caption, the
physical taking into custody: Id.
Where a writ of monition issued upon a libel of information, filed
by the United States against a promissory note, commanded the
marshal "to attach the note and to detain the same in hzs cu tody until
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the further order of the court respecting the sane ;" mad the
marshal returned the writ with his endorsement thereon- that' We
had "arrested theprOperlyithin memtided:' Held, in'atLcttflo
against the marshal for a false return: 1st, that due and legal ser-
vice of the writ Dequired the marshal to take the note into his
actual custody and control: and 2d, that the return of the marshal
signified that he had actually taken the note into his custody and
under his control: Id.
Agency.-The war revoked the agency of a citizen of the State
of Georgia, in said state, for a citizen of Massachusetts, which
existed when the war commenced, without any act of revocation
or renunciation by the parties: Howell v. Gordon, 39 or 40 Ga.
INTERNATIoNAL LAw.-See 1nstrrection.
Intercourse with Enemy.-Intercourse during war with an
enemy is unlawful, to parties standing in the relation of debtor and
creditor ps much as to those who do not: United States v. Gross-
mayer, 9 Wall.
Conceding that a creditor may have an agent in an enemy's
country to whom his debtor there may pay a debt contracted before
the war, yet the agent must be one~who was appointed before tim
war. . He cannot be one appointed during it: 4
A transaction originally unlawful-such as a person's uttlawful
trading in behalf of another with an enemy--cannot be made
lawful by any ratification: Id.
LAzNY.--See Criminal Law.
LIMITATIONs, STATUTE OF.
Suspended during War-Appeals to Supreme Court.-The doc-
trine declared in Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wallace 532 that statutes
of limitations do not run during the rebellion against a party re-
siding out of the .rebellious states, io as to preclude his remedy
for a debt against a person residing in one of them, held applicable
to the Judiciary Acts of 1789 and 1803, limiting the right of appeal
from the inferior federal courts to this court, to five years from the
time when the decree complained of was rendered, The Protector,
9 Wall.
TheAct of March, 1867, allowing appeals from federal courts
in district where the regular sessions of such courts subsequently
to the rendering of the judgment had been supended by rebellion,
to be brought within one year from the date of the passage of
the act, is an enabling act, not a restraining one: Id.
MALPRAOTICE.
Action against Physician for.-A case of action against a
physician or surgeon arising from want of care or skill in the cure
of a patient does not survive against an executor: Vittum v
Gillman, Adm'r, 48 or 49 N. H.
Nor can a suit be maintained against the executor to recover for
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increased expenses incurred by such patient, where they are
merely, incidental to an injury which is purely personal and dies
with the wrong-doer: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Liability of Master to Servant for Negligence.-Where, in an
action brought against a corporation by one of its laborers em-
ployed in blasting, for an injury occasioned by the premature dis-
charge of a blast, loaded with a newly invented powder which he
was directed to use by the defendant's foreman or superintendent,
the complaint alleged that the company furnished the powder for use
in its ordinary and appropriate business; that it had never been
used as an explosive in blasting, and was, in fact, unfit and unsafe
for such use; and'that the plaintiff was ignorant of its dangerous
properties: field, on demurrer, that a right of actibn was unques-
tionably stated: Spelman v. The Fisher Iron Company, 56 Barb.
field also, that the risk of personal injury in blasting with
the ordinary appliances used for that purpose, the plaintiff as-
sumed, under his contract with the company, to labor in that em-
ployment; but not those risks attendantupon the use of an unusal,
untested and exceedingly dangerous article which could not be
tamped without inevitable explosion, the dangerous quality of
which was unknown to him: Id.
That it was gross negligence in the company to furnish such an
article for the laborer's use, without giving him information in
that particular; whether the company was aware of its danger-
ous quality, or furnished it for use without having taken any steps
to obtain such knowledge: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Liability for Property Destroyed by a Mob.-Where an individual
sues the town or city for damages for the destruction of his property
by a mob, under ch. 1519, Laws of 1854, it is immaterial whether
the defendant could or ought to have prevented the destruction
of the plaintiff's property: Chadbourne v New Castle, 48 N. H.
It is is also immaterial whether any or all of the rioters were
citizens of the defendant town or city: Id.
In such case the destruction of the plaintiff's property would b6
caused by his illegal or improper conduct, within the meaning of
the word "caused" as used in the statute, if without such conduct
on his part the destruction would not have occurred: Id.
It is immaterial how remote in time the illegal or improper con-
duct of the plaintiff was, if, in fact, the destruction of his property
was caused by it: Id.
The "improper" conduct referred to in this statute, is such con-
duct as a man of ordinary and reasonable care and prudence would
not, under the circumstances, have been guilty of; and the defend-
ant town or city will not be liable, if the destruction of the plain-
tiff's property woul I not have happened, but for something said or
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done by plaintiff, which a man of ordinary prudence, under the
circumstances, would not have said or done: Id.
PARTNERsHi.-See Bills and Notes.
ILEADXING.-See Common Carrier.
Several- Counts-Some Good and Some Bad.-In an indictment
containing several counts, with a general verdict of guilty, the'ver-
dict will be sustained and the judgment will not be arrested, if there
is one good count in the indictment: Glines v. Smith, 48 N. H.
But in a civil suit where there are several counts, on each of
which damages are claimed, with a general verdict for plaintiff, if
one count-is bad, the judgment must be arrested on motion, be-
cause the court have no means of apportioning the damages: Id.
But where in a civil suit there are several counts, but all de-
scribing ihe same cause of action, each setting it forth in a different
way, and where damages are sought to be recovered on some one
count only, and these facts appear in the case, or from the certificate
of the judge who tried the case; and also, that all the evidence
was applicable to the good count, and that the same was fully
proved, the verdict will be sustained if there is one good count in
the writ, even though all the rest may be bad, and the verdict
may be amended so as to apply to the good count when necessary,
but the judgment will not be arrested: Id.
It will be irregular for the judge at the trial of a cause, even at
the request of the jury, to send to them minutes of "the strongest
or most indirect evidence" on one side alone, on a material point,
and a verdict will be set aside for :that cause: Id.
When witnesses are called to impeach a principal witness by
stating that such witness has, out of court, made statements in
conflict with the testimony on the stand, such witness may be re-
called and asked the direct question whether or not he made the
statement thus imputed to him, though the question may be
leading in form: Id.
SET-OFF.
Assigned Claim. -In a suit by A v. B, B cannot file in off set
a udgment recovered by M against A and assigned to B before
the commencement of A's suit: Bowe v. Langley, 48 N. H.
STAMPS.
On Process-Power of Amendment.-Nothwithstanding the
Internal Revenue Act of Congress required all stamps to instru-
ments therefore issued to be affixed by the collector of internal
revenue, it did not deprive the State courts of the power vested in
them by virtue of section 327 of the Code, which provides that
"when a party shall give, in good faith, notice of appeal from a
judgment or order, and shall omit, through mistake, to do any other
act necessary to perfect the appeal, or to the proceedings, the court
may permit an amendment on such terms as may be just :" Cop-
pernoll v. Ketcham., 56 Barb.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Although the section of the Act of Congress which allowed par-
ties desiring to use in court instruments which had not been properly
stamped, to affix such stamp in the presence of the court, and there-
upon to use such instruments in evidence, was amended so as
require such stamps to be affixed by the collector of internal reve-
nue, vet it was not intended to include such instruments as were
in the nature of process of courts of record: Id.
Nor could it have been intended to take' from the State courts
the power to control and amend their process as they should deem
proper, provided the revenue contemplated by the Internal Reve-
nue Act was secured to the general government. But the amend-
ment was intended to apply to such instruments as were the acts
of individuals or corporations only :1d.
Congress has no power to prohibit State courts from taking
jurisdiction of an action for the want of a revenue stamp: Id.
After the respondent has appeared generally, on an appeal to
the county court, and has notice the cause for trial, and moved the'
trial of it, it is too late for him to object that the appeal has not
been regularly affected for the want of a revenue stamp upon the
notice of appeal: Id.
TREspAss.
Equitable Jurisdiction in Cases of.-A court of equity will
not entertain a bill to restrain the committing of an ordinary tres-
pass merely upon the ground thatthe defendant is not pecuniarily
able to respond to the damages that may be recovered: Morgan
v. Palmer, 48 or 49 N. H.
UNITED STATES CouRTs.-See Courts-Limitations.
Jurisdiction-Claim of Title under the United States.-A
question of Federal jurisdiction, under the 25th section of the Judi-
ciary Act, is not necessarily raised by every suit for real estate in
which the parties claiming under the Federal government are at
.issue as to which of them is entitled to the benefit of that title:
Carpenter v. Williams, 9 Wall.
And when the issue turns solely upon the personal identity of
the individual to whom the recorder of land titles confirmed, or
meant to confirm a lot of ground-as ex. gr. whether when he
confirmed the land in the name Luois Lacroix he really meant
Joseph Lacroix-a matter to be determined by th rules of common
law-this court has no jurisdiction, even though the parties
claimed under the Federal government: Id.
UNITED STATES OFFicEns.-See Confederate States.
WRIT OF ENTRY.
Abatement.-Pleading.-In a writ of entry at common law,
the death of'a sole tenant of' the freehold necessarily abates the
writ: Pierce v. Jaquith, 48 N. H.
The writ of entry which our statute authorizes to foreclose a
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIOn'S.
mortgage on real estate, constitutes an exception to the above
rule: Id.
The provisions of our statute authorizing administrators to
prosecute and defend in writs of entry pending at the decease of
their intestate, apply only to cases of mortgages and to cases where
the administrator, as the representative of the estate, has an in-
terest in the land, and cannot apply to cases where the land de-
scends to and vests in in the heir: Id.
When a tenant in a writ of entry dies, and his administrator
is summoned in to defend, it is the better course in practice for
him to appear, and if he makes any claim for the estate, to state
it in his his plea, otherwise to plead non-tenure, or disclaim, when
the suit will abate: Id.
Color of Title-( onstructive Possession of Lanc.-There can
be no constructive possession of land without color of title: Wells
v. Jackson Iron Co., 48 N. H.
If the plaintiffs grantor, having color of title to lot A enterg
upon any part of that lot, this gives him constructive possession
of the whole lot, and that would give his grantee, this plaintiff
such seizin of the whole lot that he could maintain a writ of entry
against one entering upon any part of said lot without title: Id
But if the plaintiff's grantor, having color of title to lot A only
makes an entry upon lot B, and takes possession of a part of it.
and afterward conveys lot A only to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
thereby acquires no right to or seizin of lot B: Id.
If one should take possession of the summit of Mount Washing-
ton, and then convey the same specifically, or the lot or grant which
contains it, to the plaintiff, he may maintain a writ of entry against
any one subsequently entering withoutrights upon said summit: Id.
But if the plaintiffs grantor, having taken possession of the
summit of Mount Washington, conveys to plaintiff some other
lot which does not embrace such summit, the plaintiff can take no
benefit from his grantor's possession of lands which have not been
conveyed to him : Id.
In this case plaintiff's grantor, having color of title to Thomp-
son and Meserves' purchase, from one who had made an entry
thereon, entered upon the summit of Mount Washington, and
afterward conveyed Thompson and Meserves' purchase to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff had never been in possession of the sum-
mit of the mountain, and he introduced no evidence tending to
show that said summit was within the limits of said purchase :
Held, that the plaintiff could not maintain a writ of entry for the
summit of Mount Washington: Id.
An entire stranger to a title, one who shows no interest what-
ever in the premises, is not in a position to object to the title of
his opponent. But when he shows himself interested in the title
to the premises, he may then require his opponent, claiming the
same premises, to show not only an authority to convey and a
ronveyance under it, but that the authority under which the sale
was made was strictly pursued: Id.
